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I. Introduction
Currently, the common law is comprised of property, tort, and contract, but
it once included criminal law.1 In the United States, criminal law has become a
* The author is a graduate of the Georgetown University Law Center and Vanderbilt
University with a bachelor’s in economics.
† The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author, and in no way reflect the
views of the University of Wyoming College of Law, the Wyoming State Bar, the Wyoming Law
Review, nor any of its members.
See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
1
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creature of statute.2 The common law crime of rape might be the most different
from its statutory equivalent, as it required a showing of force and provided for
spousal immunity.3 These differences were codified in the late 20th century in
the statutory offense of “sexual assault” or as amendments to “rape” statutes in
other jurisdictions.4
Despite such differences, both the 18th century apologists of the common
law crime and the 20th century framers of the modern offense argued that the
law should protect consent.5 For example, spousal immunity was once justified
on the ground that women consent to marriage (at least theoretically), just as
the legislative abolition of the spousal immunity defense was based on the fact
that a spouse can withdraw consent.6 Accordingly, sexual assault has come to be
recognized as the quintessential crime with a consent defense.7
Despite general agreement that nonconsensual sex is the essence of sexual
assault, scholars of the “sui generis” crime have struggled to articulate which
circumstances invalidate consent, notably in such controversial areas as mental

2
See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (holding that only legislation
can create a federal crime). The authority of state courts to enforce or create common law crimes
is limited. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019).

See, e.g., Lalenya Weintraub Siegel, Note, The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to
Extinction, 34 Clev. St. L. Rev. 351, 352–53, 352–53 nn.3–8 (1995) (noting that spousal
immunity survives only in Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.02 (LexisNexis 2018) as a partial exemption
to the abolition of the force requirement); see also Patricia J. Falk, Husbands Who Drug and Rape
Their Wives: The Injustice of the Marital Exemption in Ohio’s Sexual Offenses, 36 Women’s Rts. L.
Rep. 265 (2015) (arguing that Ohio’s failure to treat cases of drugging as forcible is unjust, despite
its apparent basis in sound statutory interpretation).
3

4
P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Criminal Law: Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 1194, 1198 (1997). Twenty-two states have sexual assault statutes. See, e.g.,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1406 (2017); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-402 (2018); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:14-2 (2019); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011 (West 2017); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302
(2018). Twenty-four states have rape statutes. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 22 (2018); 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3121 (2018); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-61 (2018). While there is no consistent
definition for either term, sexual assault more frequently includes all sexual acts, and sometimes
second and fourth degree sexual assault includes all sexual contact. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann.
§§ 5-14-124 to -127 (2018) (requires authority figure); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-70 to -71 (2018);
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 707-730 to -733 (2018); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-319 to -320 (2018).
5
Compare 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *213 (expressing pride in the common
law’s recognition of the inalienable right to withdraw consent), with Luis E. Chiesa, Solving the
Riddle of Rape-by Deception, 35 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 407, 440– 42 (2017) (describing the move
away from the common law’s failure to protect consent).

Compare Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown 629–30 (Robert
Small ed., 1847)(1736) (discussing spousal consent to marriage justification), with Falk, supra note
3, at 288– 89 (discussing revocability of spousal consent).
6

See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Feminism and Disciplinarity: The Curl of the Petals, 27 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 225, 258 (1993) (noting that law professors typically use it as such).
7
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capacity, abuse of trust, and abuse of authority.8 In contrast, the more stable body
of contract law has proven susceptible to black letter principles.9 Contract law
has remained stable despite changing and variable commercial practices because
it has been reduced to a broad, descriptive framework.10 This Article endeavors
to provide similar principles for sexual assault because consent does and should
turn on the same concept as in contract law.11 Contract law is well-equipped
to answer one of sexual assault’s thorniest doctrinal questions: whether assent
amounts to valid consent.12
Part II of this Article first deconstructs critiques that sexual assault law does
not consistently recognize circumstances invalidating consent, namely incapacity,
fraud, and imbalances of power.13 The first critique is that the many exceptions
to statutory rape represent a failure to protect children who lack the capacity
to consent.14 The second critique is that sexual assault law does not or cannot
recognize the power of fraud to invalidate consent in a principled manner.15 The
third critique suggests that sexual assault law does and should turn on abuse of
power, instead of consent.16 Part II argues that these critiques are based on invalid
conceptions of consent.17
The threefold attack on consent regarding incapacity, fraud, and the abuse
of power, should concern prosecutors, defendants, and legislatures. This Article
8
Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 Colum.
L. Rev. 1442, 1449 (1993) (“Rape is sui generis.”); Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related
Offenses, Am. L. Inst., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and-related-offenses/ (last
visited February 9, 2019) [hereinafter Sexual Assault and Related Offenses] (video remarks of Stephen
J. Schulhofer) (explaining that the otherwise successful Model Penal Code failed to provide a lasting
definition of sexual assault because of controversy concerning when mental capacity, abuse of trust,
and abuse of authority invalidate consent).

See Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern
Development of Contract Law, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 508 (1998); Richard A. Epstein, Simple
Rules for a Complex World 327 (1995) (“[W]e could do as well with the Roman law of contract
as we do with any modern system dedicated to the principle of freedom of contract.”); see also infra
notes 148 –52 and accompanying text (discussing welfare justifications for contractual protection
of consent).
9

See Maggs, supra note 9, at 508 (explaining that the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
though rule-based, is abstract enough to avoid deviating from first principles); see also Pierre J.
Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985).
10

11
Sexual assault and breach of contract both turn on consent, although the former frames
consent as a defense and the latter frames the absence of consent as a defense. See infra notes 167–68
and accompanying text.
12
See Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations back cover (2003) (summarizing
“the difficult question [as] whether ‘yes’ means ‘yes.’”).
13

See infra notes 26 –103 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 34 –50 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 51– 88 and accompanying text.

16

See infra notes 89–103 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 26 –103 and accompanying text.
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aims to provide them with a clear and uniform consent model that will stand
the test of time. Part III applies contract doctrines to define consent consistently
with current sexual assault law.18 This part does so by introducing several novel
insights, namely: (1) that the inconsistencies in the protection of incapacity
can be reconciled by replacing capacity with the contractual concept of undue
influence;19 (2) that the doctrine of fraud in the factum represents a principled
justification for the contours of the modern offense of sexual assault by fraud;20
and (3) that the contractual standard of duress, along with the common law’s
treatment of monopoly power, demonstrate that criminal law’s redress of power
imbalances is conterminous with consent.21
Part IV addresses the advantages of the contractual model for the
criminal justice system.22 Specifically, a proper understanding of consent will
provide the benefits of substantive justice, enhanced public cooperation, and a
clearer jurisprudence.23
Part V summarizes this Article’s insights about consent in the realm of
criminal sexual assault and presents them in the form of a model code.24 Such
a code would have the dual merits of codifying paradigmatic cases of sexual
wrongdoing while achieving the universality of a common law standard. Thus,
this Article will frame sexual assault as a common law crime.25

II. Invalid Critiques of the Current Law’s Failure
to Consistently Protect Consent
Critiques of contractual consent as an adequate model of sexual assault law
assert that the law fails to consistently recognize nonconsensual sexual acts in
the following circumstances: (1) incapacity; (2) fraud; and (3) imbalances of
power. The first of these arguments is that sexual assault law fails to embody
the consent model because of the marital defense to certain kinds of statutory

18

See infra notes 104–43 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 109–18 and accompanying text. Undue influence is an act of persuasion
that is unfair in view of the relationship between the parties. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 177 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
19

See infra notes 119–31 and accompanying text. Fraud in the factum is a fraud as to the
essential nature of the transaction. 7 Arthur L. Corbin et al., Corbin on Contracts § 28.22 (2017).
20

21

See infra notes 132– 43 and accompanying text.

22

See infra notes 144 – 69 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 148–52 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of substantive
justice); infra notes 153–61 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of public cooperation);
infra notes 162– 69 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of clearer jurisprudence).
23

24

See infra notes 170 – 83 and accompanying text.

25

See infra notes 170– 83 and accompanying text.
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rape.26 The apparent exception can be reconciled by reconceiving these crimes as
nonconsensual because of undue influence, rather than incapacity.27
Inversely, the second argument takes an apparent exception to fraud
protection as a flaw with the consent model.28 While sexual assault law applies to
fraud in the factum, it does not protect against fraud in the inducement, as in the
case of a fraudulent offer of consideration for sex.29 A growing trend in criminal
scholarship considers the fraud in the factum doctrine meaningless, concluding
that sexual assault law fails to protect consent generally.30
Finally, some authors have directly attacked the consent model by arguing
that, regardless of consent, abuses of power are and ought to be considered sexual
assault.31 Accordingly, they argue that the best way to model sexual assault law
would turn on abuse of power rather than consent.32 Because sexual harassment is
a type of abuse of power, the abuse of power model would eliminate the distinction
between sexual harassment and sexual assault. This part of the Article will explain
why the consent model can offer a better accounting of what the law recognizes
as sexual assault than abuse of power.33

A. Apparent Exceptions to Incapacity Protection
Since the 13th century, statutes have deemed children below a certain age
incapable of consenting to sex as a matter of law.34 As its name would suggest,
statutory rape is based on a legislative rule, rather than an individualized inquiry
into the child’s capacity.35 Because not all children develop at the same rate,
an age-based rule can result in convictions where the child had the subjective

See infra notes 34 –50 and accompanying text. Broadly speaking, what these offenses have
in common are that they: (1) specifically apply to teenagers; (2) can only be committed by a person
with relative age or authority; (3) irrebuttably deem the act nonconsensual; and (4) have a spousal
immunity defense. Id.
26

27
See infra notes 109–18 and accompanying text. Undue influence is an act of persuasion
that is unfair in view of the relationship between the parties. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 177 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
28

See infra notes 51–88 and accompanying text.

29

See, e.g., infra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.

30

See infra notes 51– 88 and accompanying text.

31

See infra notes 89–103 and accompanying text.

32

See infra notes 89–103 and accompanying text.

33

See infra notes 89–103 and accompanying text.

See Carolyn E. Cocca, Jailbait: The Politics of Statutory Rape Laws in the United
States 10 (2004); Erin K. Jackson, Addressing the Inconsistency Between Statutory Rape Laws and
Underage Marriage: Abolishing Early Marriage and Removing the Spousal Exemption to Statutory Rape,
85 UMKC L. Rev. 343, 344 –45 (2017).
34

35

See Richard Posner, Sex and Reason 402 (1992).
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capacity to consent in fact but not in law, and in acquittals where the child,
though above the age of consent and expressing willingness, could not consent.36
However, to protect infants as a whole, the age of consent is codified. Precisely
because infants lack the capacity to consent, the law places the risk of liability
on adults, precluding a mistake-of-age defense.37 Strict liability as to the age of
consent is the only way to prevent adults from having sex with children who
misrepresent their capacity.38
Because of its bright-line simplicity, statutory rape is a natural starting point
for addressing the adequacy of sexual assault law in terms of consent. Despite this
simplicity, critics point to a number of apparent inconsistencies in the treatment
of capacity, both in support of age-difference statutes and against the marital
exception.39 The answer to reconciling these inconsistencies may be to adopt a
new theory within the consent model, replacing incapacity with undue influence,
which would turn on: (1) the vulnerability of a person who has the capacity to
consent but who is still a child; and (2) abuse of that vulnerability by an adult.40
Turning to the age-difference exception, while children below a certain age
can never consent to sex, a host of sexual assault statutes prescribe special rules
for older children.41 The archetypical exception, sometimes called a “Romeo and
Juliet law,” allows older children to consent to intercourse with a peer in-age
without criminal liability.42 Other laws allow older children to have sex with
adults generally, but deem an act nonconsensual when the adult is an authority
figure.43 While a child’s choice of sexual partner does not determine mental

36

See id.

Ordinarily, under the mens rea requirements of criminal law, mistake as to the fact of
consent is a defense. State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68, 272 Wis. 2d 418, 680 N.W.2d 810, 817
(Wisc. 2004).
37

38
Contra Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, Adult Impersonation: Rape by
Fraud as A Defense to Statutory Rape, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 75 (2007) (questioning the fairness of
punishing adults for an act to which they did not consent).
39

See infra notes 42– 45 and accompanying text.

40

See infra notes 109 –18 and accompanying text.

41

See infra notes 42– 43, 45.

See Danielle Flynn, All the Kids Are Doing It: The Unconstitutionality of Enforcing Statutory
Rape Laws Against Children & Teenagers, 47 New Eng. L. Rev. 681, 687–91 (2013).
42

See, e.g., Alaska Stat. §§ 11.41.434 –.440 (2018) (sexual abuse of a minor); id. § 11.41.470
(definitions); Fla. Stat. § 794.011 (2018); Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9 (2019); Iowa Code § 709.4
(2018); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.060 (LexisNexis 2018) (rape of minor); id. § 510.110 (sexual
abuse); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-308 (LexisNexis 2018); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303 (2018)
(second degree sexual assault); id. § 6-2-301 (authority defined); id. § 6-2-314 (sexual abuse of
a minor).
43
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capacity to consent, the ability of an adult to exploit youthful vulnerability is
essential to undue influence.44
Spousal immunity is another apparent exception to incapacity protection for
children old enough to marry.45 Marriage is also an exception to many studentteacher statutes.46 The undue influence model can also reconcile this defense with
consent because, unlike incapacity, undue influence depends on the relationship
between the parties and can be overcome by independent advice.47 In this case,
the independent advice comes through the requirement that children cannot
marry without parental consent or judicial approval.48
Accordingly, the exceptions to statutory rape of older children are not
exceptions to the contractual consent model if the act is considered nonconsensual
by reason of undue influence rather than incapacity.49 However, inconsistency in
another area of sexual assault law, fraud, has cast doubt on whether sexual assault
turns on consent.50

B. Reconstructing the Doctrine of Sexual Assault by Fraud in the Factum
No current topic has engendered more controversy as to whether sexual
assault consistently covers nonconsensual conduct than the crime of sexual assault

44
See 7 Corbin et al., supra note 20, § 2810 (defining the elements of undue influence as the
use of a dominant position against a subservient party); Ann T. Spence, A Contract Reading of Rape
Law: Redefining Force to Include Coercion, 37 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 57, 84 (2003) (suggesting
an undue influence interpretation of statutes concerning authority figures).

See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 770 (2019); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.020 (LexisNexis
2018); La. Stat. Ann. § 14:80 (2018); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-a (2018); S.D. Codified Laws
§ 22-22-7 (2019); Vt. Stat. Ann. 13, § 3253 (2018); W. Va. Code § 61-8B-3 (2018). Because
marriage does not change a person’s mental capacity, one author considers the marital exception to
statutory rape tantamount to legalized sexual assault. Jackson, supra note 34, at 344– 45, 370–72.
45

46
See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-124 (2018); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-5.1 (2018); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 21-5512 (2018); La. Stat. Ann. § 14:81.4 (2018); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A,
§§ 253–54, 255-A, 260 (2017); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.520d, .520e (LexisNexis 2018); Miss.
Code. Ann. § 43-47-18 (2019); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 201.540–.550 (2018); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 30-9-11 (2018); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.32 (2018); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-755 (2018); Wash.
Rev. Code §§ 9A.44.093, .096 (2018); Wis. Stat. § 948.095 (2018).
47
See 7 Corbin et al., supra note 20, § 28.10 (defining undue influence); see also, e.g.,
Modonese v. Delac Estate, [2011] B.C.S.C. 82, ¶ 121–23 (Can. B.C.) (noting that independent
counsel can overcome undue influence in a testament).

See Jackson, supra note 34, at 351–52 n.47 (listing statutes requiring parental consent for
marriage). See also, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 n.16 (1979) (noting that parents can
consent on behalf of their children).
48

49

See supra notes 34– 48 and accompanying text.

50

See infra notes 51– 88 and accompanying text.
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by fraud.51 While all nonconsensual touching is battery, including touching for
which assent was induced by a material fraud, sexual assault law only recognizes
fraud in the factum.52 Contrasted against the opposing concept of fraud in the
inducement, fraud in the factum refers to misrepresentation of an act’s essential
nature, rather than its collateral consequences.53 In sexual assault law, the two
areas of deception considered essential for purposes of fraud in the factum are:
(1) misrepresenting the actor’s identity; and (2) misrepresenting that the act
has a professional, rather than sexual, purpose.54 A growing trend in criminal
law scholarship considers the difference between essential and collateral
misrepresentation meaningless, and therefore finds the state of the law to be
inconsistent with consent.55 Accordingly, a better explanation of fraud in the
factum is needed to provide an adequate model of consent in sexual assault.
The first critique of fraud in the factum is that misrepresenting the actor’s
identity or the act’s purpose are themselves the only significant examples of
material fraud.56 The problem with the first critique is that there are many
other examples of material fraud.57 Inversely, the second critique is that, because
other examples of fraud in the inducement cause greater harm, the doctrine is
unprincipled.58 The flaw with the second critique is that the crime of sexual
assault depends on the sexual nature of the act itself rather than the gravity of
the harm caused by a nonconsensual act.59 Finally, a third critique looks at the
apparent inconsistencies with fraud in the factum to argue that, unlike contract
law, sexual assault law can never find a consistent definition of consent.60 The
issue with the third critique is that, regardless of which area of law is more flawed
in practice, both sexual assault law and contract law share the same fundamental
goal of accurately defining consent.61
See Chiesa, supra note 5, at 459– 61; Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and
the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 Yale L.J. 1372 (2013); Tom Dougherty, No Way Around Consent:
A Reply to Rubenfeld on “Rape-by-Deception,” 123 Yale L.J. Online 321, 328–29, 332–33 (2013);
Patricia J. Falk, Not Logic, but Experience: Drawing on Lessons from the Real World in Thinking About
the Riddle of Rape-by-Fraud, 123 Yale L.J. Online 353, 354–56 (2013) [hereinafter Falk, Not Logic,
but Experience]; Kiel Brennan-Marquez, A Quite Principled Conceit: A Response to Jed Rubenfeld, The
Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 Yale L.J. 1372, 1375–76
(2013); Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals, 27 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 4 (2015).
51

52

See Rubenfeld, supra note 51, at 1397–1401.

53

7 Corbin et al., supra note 20, § 28.22.

54

See Falk, Not Logic, but Experience, supra note 51, at 357–58.

55

See supra note 51.

56

See infra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.

57

See infra notes 62– 64 and accompanying text.

58

See infra notes 65–80 and accompanying text.

59

See infra note 72 and accompanying text.

60

See infra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.

61

See infra notes 81– 86 and accompanying text.
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The first argument for abandoning fraud in the factum is that it would
be simpler and more consistent to describe sexual assault as encompassing
all fraudulently induced consent because identity and professional-purpose
misrepresentation are the two most significant material frauds.62 However, not
only are there other material frauds, but some may be even more harmful.63 For
example, at least one person has argued that impersonating a celebrity to obtain a
sexual act from a fan may cause less harm than misrepresenting serious romantic
intentions, fertility, sexually transmitted diseases, and prophylactics of the same.64
Thus, the second argument against fraud in the factum is not based on its
redundancy, but rather its inconsistency.65 This argument follows from breakingdown the distinction between essential and collateral misrepresentation, which
supposedly turns on an arbitrary choice on how to describe the act consented to.66
In other words, when there is fraud in the inducement, there is no consent to the
combined act of sex plus collateral fact.67 However far from being arbitrary, the
decision whether consent, if any, applies to a sexual act is inherently required by
the definition of sexual assault.68
Furthermore, the decision whether consent applies to a sexual act cannot
be avoided by providing a narrower or broader description of the subject act.69

62
See Yung, supra note 51, at 13; Falk, Not Logic, but Experience, supra note 51, at 365–68;
Posner, supra note 35, at 392–93 (explaining why fraud in the inducement may be less harmful).
63

See notes 62– 64 and accompanying text.

64

See Chiesa, supra note 5, at 459– 61.

65

See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.

66

See Wertheimer, supra note 12, at 206.

67

Id.

California, the District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, North Carolina, North Dakota,
and Vermont use “sexual acts,” as the actus reus of the offense while Illinois, New York, and Ohio
use “sexual conduct.” See Cal. Penal Code § 261 (Deering 2018); D.C. Code § 22-3002 (2018);
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-1.20 (LexisNexis 2018); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 253 (2017);
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-303 (LexisNexis 2018); N.Y. Penal Law § 130.35 (McKinney
2019); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.21 (2018); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-20-03 to -04 (2019);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.02 (LexisNexis 2018); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit 13, § 3252 (2018).
Additionally, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming use “sexual contact,” typically for a lesser offense. See Ala. Code § 13A6-66 (2018); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-404 (2018); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 767 (2019); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.110 (LexisNexis 2018); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 255-A (LexisNexis
2019); Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342–.3451 (2019); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.100 (2018); N.Y. Penal Law
§§ 130.52, .65 (McKinney 2019); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.33 (2018); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.120-03 to -04 (2019); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 163.415 to .425 (2018); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 22-22-7.1,
-7.4 (2019); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-501, -505 (2018); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.44.010, 100
(2018); W. Va. Code § 61-8B-7 (2018); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-301, 303 (2019).
68

69

See infra notes 70 –72 and accompanying text.
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Physical penetration is a narrower definition of the act, but reliance on such an
alternative test for fraud would require treating, for example, penetrative medical
treatment performed with a reckless failure to obtain informed consent the same
as concealing a sexual purpose.70 Such an approach may be contrary to law as
most states prohibiting nonconsensual “sexual contact” further define the actus
reus with respect to a “sexual purpose.”71 Moreover, such a narrow definition
would not align with the psychological harm caused by an involuntary sexual act,
which is what sets sexual assault apart as a more serious offense than battery.72
Conversely, a broader definition of the actus reus of sexual assault would
include collateral facts such that the inquiry becomes whether the assailant
misrepresented an undesirable act as a desirable act.73 The problem with
attempting to state sexual assault in such general terms, whether any act was
induced by material fraud, is exactly that.74 Accordingly, fraud in the factum turns
on the same inquiry as any case of sexual assault: whether consent was given to a
sexual act.75
Even though sexual assault requires a definition of the sexual act, some
scholars have suggested abandoning the fraud in the factum doctrine by opening
sexual assault to include sexual acts that are candidly represented as sexual and
are induced by a material misrepresentation of collateral facts, such as fertility
or infection.76 However, the psychological harm suffered by such acts may be
Cf., e.g., Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 439 (2003) (explaining
negligence liability for physicians who fail to obtain informed consent).
70

71
See Fla. Stat. § 794.011(1)(h) (2018) (“[S]exual battery does not include an act done
for a bona fide medical purpose.”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.01 (LexisNexis 2018) (defining
“sexual contact” with respect to a sexual purpose); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 163.452–.454 (2018); 11 R.I.
Gen. Laws § 1-37-1 (2019); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-651 (2018) (excluding acts performed with a
medical purpose from the definition of “sexual contact”); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-22-7.1 (2019);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501 (2018) (defining “sexual contact” with respect to a sexual purpose);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (LexisNexis 2018) (defining “forcible sexual abuse” with respect to a
sexual purpose); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.010 (2018) (defining “sexual contact” with respect to a
sexual purpose); W. Va. Code § 61-8B-1 (2019) (defining “sexual contact” with respect to a sexual
purpose); Wis. Stat. § 940.225 (2017); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301 (2018).

Yung, supra note 51, at 4 –5 (explaining that unique, psychological harm sets sexual assault
apart from other violent crimes).
72

73

See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.

As with narrowing sexual assault to penetration, broadening sexual assault to any act
would fail to align with the statutory purpose of punishing sexual acts. See supra notes 69–72 and
accompanying text.
74

75

See supra notes 73 –74 and accompanying text.

See Katherine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 Minn. L. Rev.
221 (2015) (proposing a tort for fraud in the inducement); Dougherty, supra note 51, at 328–29,
332–33 (proposing a lesser offense for fraud in the inducement); Alexandra Brodsky, ‘RapeAdjacent’: Imagining Legal Responses to Nonconsensual Condom Removal, 2 Colum. J. Gender. & L.
183 (2017); contra Susan Estrich, Real Rape 102 (1987) (“The ‘force’ or ‘coercion’ that negates
consent ought to be defined to include . . . misrepresentations of material fact.”).
76
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distinguished from the experience of a nonconsensual sexual act.77 These scholars
tacitly admit as much in accepting that fraud in the inducement should constitute
a lesser offense than sexual assault.78 The lesser offenses are often included as
battery or as a more specific offense aimed at the collateral harm.79
Despite the soundness of the factum doctrine, Professor Corey Rayburn
Yung has used its apparent weaknesses to assert that sexual assault cannot turn
on a principled definition of consent in the same way that contract law does.80
Professor Yung writes that consent cannot be distilled to abstract principles
because the law results from multifaceted, real-world compromises.81 However,
this general problem with legal theories is consistent with a principled, descriptive
model.82 Further arguing that sexual assault law is uniquely ad hoc, Professor
Yung asserts that sexual consent must involve simple rules by which criminals can
predictably be held accountable without a written record.83 This is incompatible
with borrowing definitions of consent from contract law, Professor Yung asserts,
lest the criminal law produce absurd results such as requiring notarization
before every sexual act.84 This half-jesting conclusion perpetuates a century-old
misconception of contract law as a body of formalities rather than principles.85
Contract law does not require writings except for under the statute of frauds,
which, as its name suggests, has more to do with preventing perjury than defining
See Posner, supra note 35, at 392–93 (contrasting fraud in the factum as “disgusting as
well as humiliating, rather than merely humiliating as in the case of the [more] common [collateral]
misrepresentations”); Falk, Not Logic, but Experience, supra note 51, at 361.
77

78

See supra note 77.

See HIV and STD Criminal Laws, Ctr. For Disease Control, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/
policies/law/states/exposure.html (last updated Nov. 30, 2018) (noting that concealing a sexually
transmitted disease can be prosecuted as reckless endangerment and attempted murder). The harm
of concealing fertility, while recoverable, has not been treated as severely as it could be in order to
serve the interests of the child. See Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Sexual Partner’s Tort Liability to
Other Partner for Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Sterility or Use of Birth Control Resulting
in Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R. 301 § 7 (1992); Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies, and the Duty to Disclose,
47 Ariz. L. Rev. 871, 891–92 & nn.110 –15 (2005) (listing cases of liability for special damages
from misrepresentation). Fraud in the inducement is generally tortious, if not criminal. See Jane E.
Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature ‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking
of Seduction, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 374, 404 n.133 (1993) (listing cases of recovery for reliance on
sexual promises); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 530 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1977) (liability for
reliance on unenforceable promise).
79

See Yung, supra note 51, at 4 (“Ultimately, Rubenfeld’s errors leading him to his disastrous
conclusion highlight the need for a clearer articulation of rape law foundations.”).
80

81

Id. at 5, 14 –15.

82

See id. at 28–29.

83

Id. at 11–12.

84

Id.

See, e.g., Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the Common
Law, 40 Ind. L. Rev., no. 2, 2007, at 206, 237–40 (first restatement); Maggs, supra note 9, at 508
(second restatement).
85
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consent.86 In fact, the contract standard of fraud is based on a fact-specific inquiry
into the parties’ justified expectations of disclosure.87

C. Failure to Account for Power Imbalances
Giving up the project of defining consent and sexual assault harmoniously,
Professors Bucchandler-Raphael and Schneebaum have instead proposed
adopting an abuse of power theory.88 Under the abuse of power model, a
sexual act constitutes sexual assault when it is induced by an abuse of power,
notwithstanding consent.89 The first argument for the abuse of power model is
that there is no other way to justify a number of sexual assault statutes that do not
appear to have a consent defense.90 However, these statutes lack a consent defense
because they apply to nonconsensual situations. The second argument is that the
absence of consent is repetitive of any finding of an abuse of power.91 However,
coercion is not the only way to abuse power. Power may also be abused in order
to provide a consensual benefit.
The abuse of power model fails as a replacement for consent because it fails
to support several paradigmatic cases of sexual assault conviction.92 Proponents
of the abuse of power model assert that the consent model fails to justify certain
sexual assault statutes, such as those that prohibit relationships in custody, where
there the act is irrebuttably deemed nonconsensual.93 However, the prohibition
of custodial relationships can be easily justified on the grounds that the abuse
of power makes the act nonconsensual.94 As in the examples of statutory rape
and undue influence, a statutory presumption may provide the most accurate

See Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries 1677, 29 Chas. 2 c. 3 (Eng.) (stating in
particular the policy of providing stable title to land).
86

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 169 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (when reliance
is not justified); id. § 161 (when disclosure is required); U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (Am. Law Inst.
& Unif. Law Comm’n 1977) (“The only term which must appear [in the writing] is the quantity
term . . . .”); Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 44–45 (1965) (describing the
spectrum of good faith based on market expectations).
87

88
See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power, 21 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 77
(2010) [hereinafter Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power]; Michal Buchhandler-Raphael,
The Failure of Consent: Re-Conceptualizing Rape as Sexual Abuse of Power, 18 Mich. J. Gender &
L. 147 (2011) [hereinafter The Failure of Consent]; Galia Schneebaum, What Is Wrong With Sex In
Authority Relations? A Study in Law and Social Theory, 105 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 345 (2015).
89

See Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power, supra note 88, at 132.

90

See infra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.

91

See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.

92

See infra note 103 and accompanying text.

See Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power, supra note 88, at 79; Schneebaum, supra
note 88, at 346– 47.
93

94

See infra notes 132– 43 and accompanying text.
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determination of consent.95 Likewise, the abuse of power model is not immune
from the need for inflexible statutory presumptions.96
After reasoning that some instances of abuse of power are consensual but
deserving of punishment, Professor Buchhandler-Raphael makes the inverse
argument that all abuses of power are indeed nonconsensual.97 Accordingly, she
asserts that the “redundant” concept of sexual consent is not worth defining since
a simpler and more accurate definition of sexual assault would be as a sexual
abuse of power.98 However, Professors Bucchandler-Raphael’s and Schneebaum’s
definition of sexual assault is itself repetitive of existing sexual harassment law, and
is both over and under inclusive of sexual assault.99 The definition is over inclusive
because abuses of power not involving custody or threats can be consensual, the
classic case being acceptance of a bribe.100 The definition is underinclusive because
not all nonconsensual sexual acts are induced by an abuse of power, for instances
in cases of force, unconsciousness, or impersonation.101

III. The Contractual Model of Consent
Contractual consent, or the lack thereof, is necessary for a sexual assault
conviction despite the doctrinal challenges regarding capacity, fraud, and the
abuse of power.102 First, the contract doctrine of undue influence is better suited
to address the exploitation of older children while respecting their capacity to

See supra notes 34–50 and accompanying text (describing statutory rape and related
offenses); contra Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power, supra note 88, at 132 (criticizing the
legal presumptions inherent in defining consent).
95

96
See Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power, supra note 88, at 132 (noting that the
offense would have to be limited to abuses of official, but not personal, relationships).
97

See Buchhandler-Raphael, The Failure of Consent, supra note 88, at 204, 215.

98

See id.

Professor Schneebaum asserts that protecting professional spaces is a broader project than
sexual harassment, which requires injury and serves the limited purpose of protecting “socially
disadvantaged groups from discrimination.” Schneebaum, supra note 88, at 354 n.52. However,
sexual harassment can potentially take the form of an unlawful benefit and is not restricted
to female victims. See, e.g., Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 908–09 (8th Cir.
2006) (observing that widespread sexual favoritism can amount to a hostile work environment);
U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC-N-915-050, Policy Guidance on Current
Issues of Sexual Harassment, 2 n.3 (March 19, 1990), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/
upload/currentissues.pdf (noting that men may be victims and women may be harassers).
99

See Schneebaum, supra note 88, at 385 (noting that the abuse of power model does not
alter the legal standard for consent); id. at 383– 84 (suggesting that relevant inquiries into consent
can include who initiated the act, in what context the act was initiated, and how many times the act
was initiated).
100

101
See id. at 383 n.182 (conceding that a theory of coercion is outside scope of abuse of
power model).
102

See infra notes 105– 43 and accompanying text.
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consent.103 Second, the doctrine of fraud in the factum can distinguish between
misrepresenting an act’s essentially sexual purpose and its collateral consequences.104
Third, blanket prohibitions on sexual acts in custody are consistent with consent
because custody is an inherently coercive environment where one person has a
monopoly on another’s choices.105 This part will progress in the same order as Part
II, starting with examples of incapacity and its reorganization within the consent
model before progressing to fraud and abuse of power and their importance for
the consent model’s overall authority.106

A. The Apparent Exceptions to Incapacity are Examples of Undue Influence
For decades, courts have recognized a role for undue influence in sentencing
the sexual assailants of children, even without legislative endorsement of the
doctrine.107 Today, about half of state legislatures recognize that children who may
otherwise have the factual capacity to consent cannot legally consent to sexual acts
with authority figures and older adults.108 While these statutes have been criticized
for allowing exceptions that seem irrelevant to capacity, such as marriage, these
results can be reconciled with the both the contours of the offense and the
contractual model of consent by treating them as cases of undue influence.109
Undue influence is the best way to describe a genus of offenses that:
(1) specifically apply to teenagers; (2) can only be committed by a person with
relative age or authority; (3) irrebuttably deem the act nonconsensual; and
(4) have a spousal immunity defense.110 Point one concerns the fact that teen
agers have the capacity to consent but are still more vulnerable than adults.111
Point two relates to the fact that someone who lacks such vulnerability can
exploit it.112 Point three relates to the fact that, like traditional statutory rape
based on incapacity, the statutory regime protects the vulnerable by deeming the

103

See infra notes 109 –18 and accompanying text.

104

See infra notes 119–31 and accompanying text.

105

See infra notes 132– 43 and accompanying text.

106

See infra notes 109–43 and accompanying text.

See State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132, 144–47 (Iowa 2011); Powe v. State, 597 So. 2d 721
(Ala. 1991); State v. St. Amant, 536 A.2d 897, 900–01 (R.I. 1988); Commonwealth v. Rhodes,
510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986); cf. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 4 (1981)
(“The terminology of philosophical art is coercive: arguments are powerful and best when they are
knockdown, arguments force you to a conclusion, if you believe the premisses [sic] you have to or
must believe the conclusion. Some arguments do not carry much punch, and so forth.”).
107

108

See supra note 43.

109

See supra notes 34–50 and accompanying text.

110

See supra notes 34–50 and accompanying text.

111

See supra notes 34 –50 and accompanying text.

112

See supra notes 34–50 and accompanying text.
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act nonconsensual.113 Finally, point four relates to the foregoing three elements of
undue influence because child marriage, where permitted, requires the approval
of a parent or judge who is neither vulnerable nor exploited.114 Accordingly, once
the doctrine of undue influence is properly understood, the offenses governing
older children are fully harmonious with consent.115 The same can also be said for
defining consent in another type of sexual assault offense: fraud.116

B. Sexual Assault Law Embodies the Doctrine of Fraud in the Factum
In contract law, fraud in the factum occurs when a party misrepresents the
essence or existence of a contract.117 Unlike fraud in the inducement, fraud in the
factum makes contracts void rather than voidable, meaning that the defrauded
party maintains an absolute right in the object of the contract.118 Consent in
sexual assault turns on fraud in the factum, requiring disclosure of the sexual
purpose of an act with a particular person.119
Two scenarios illustrate the principle in sexual assault. The first case illustrates
a sexual purpose that is manifested to a professional, and the second scenario
illustrates a sexual purpose that is concealed by a professional.120 The first scenario
is fraud in the inducement and the second scenario is fraud in the factum. In both
scenarios, as in contract law, a professional relationship transforms the elements
of fraud.121
For example, sex work is a natural topic of consideration for delineating
sexual consent.122 Courts have found that a bad faith promise to pay a sex worker
is fraud in the inducement because payment is a collateral fact while the sexual
nature of the act is known.123 As with other fraud in the inducement cases, the
113

See supra notes 34 –50 and accompanying text.

114

See supra notes 34–50 and accompanying text.

115

See supra notes 34–50 and accompanying text.

116

See infra notes 119 –31 and accompanying text.

117

7 Corbin et al., supra note 20, § 28.22.

118

Id.

119

See supra notes 51–88 and accompanying text.

Compare infra notes 124 –26 and accompanying text, with infra notes 127–29 and
accompanying text.
120

121

See supra note 88 and accompanying text.

122

See infra notes 125–29.

Regina v. Petrozzi, [1987] 13 B.C.L.R. 2d. 273 (Can. B.C.); R v. Linekar [1995] 3 All ER
69 (appeal taken from Eng.). The Canadian Supreme Court later overruled Petrozzi as a matter of
statutory interpretation, recognizing fraud as a “significant risk of serious bodily harm” (i.e., failure
to disclose a sexually transmitted disease). See Regina v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371 (Can.).
The outcome of Cuerrier can be reached by the parallel approach of treating disease exposure as an
equally serious crime of violence instead. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. In contrast to
123
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defendants could have been prosecuted under crimes remedying the collateral
harm instead.124
In contrast, a growing number of sexual assault statutes criminalize the act
of misrepresenting a sexual purpose as a professional, psychiatric purpose.125
Like fraud in the inducement, such a misrepresentation can be characterized
as a promise that a sexual act will somehow improve the patient’s situation.126
However, when made by a psychiatric professional, especially in a formal setting,
such a promise is tantamount to misrepresenting the act as medical treatment.127
Some states construe fraud in the factum as inclusive of all impersonation
and professional-purpose misrepresentation without any specific legislative
guidance.128 A number of states purport to abandon fraud in the factum only to
reach the same result based on less sound methodology.129 In any case, consensus
on which cases to prosecute is more easily done than said. The same also goes for
abuses of power, which inspire the most fundamental theoretical disagreements
about consent.

C. The Common Law Recognizes Power Imbalances as Coercive
The treatment of sexual assault in situations involving power is important
because such situations have been used to question the adequacy of consent,
or lack thereof, as an element of sexual assault.130 To the contrary, the consent
model provides the most exact theory to regulate power imbalances. Specifically,
the contract definition of coercion is “an improper threat . . . that leaves the
victim no reasonable alternative . . . .”131 “Improper” is a slightly broader
concept than illegal.132 Thus, what is improper can depend on the power (and
corresponding duty not to abuse it) of the person making the threat. For example,

meretricious relations, marriage is sometimes recognized as the only enforceable sexual contract,
and thus divorce remedies may turn on fraud in the inducement. See Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law 157 (1998); Neal v. Neal,
873 P.2d 871, 876–77 (Idaho 1994) (“[F]raud or misrepresentation vitiates . . . consent.”).
124
See Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of
Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1780, 1802 n.69 (1992) (explaining theft
of services).
125

See Falk, Not Logic, but Experience, supra note 51, at 357–58 nn.23–29.

126

See supra notes 65– 80 and accompanying text.

127

See Wertheimer, supra note 12, at 230.

128

See Falk, Not Logic, but Experience, supra note 51, at 357–58.

129

Id.; Christopher & Christopher, supra note 38, at 86–89.

130

See supra notes 89–103 and accompanying text.

131

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).

132

See id. § 176.
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an offer that discriminates against the recipient is considered a coercive threat
when the offeror has monopoly power.133 By the same principle, civil rights law
prohibits discrimination by the common law equivalent of regulated monopolies:
common carriers.134
Custodial sexual assault demonstrates the monopoly principle because no
threat is required and assent is no defense.135 While other areas of sexual assault
involving incapacity and undue influence do not require a threat or consider
assent relevant either, custodial sexual assault is distinguishable because it applies
to adults who are not inherently vulnerable, but rather coerced by the fact that
they are in custody.136 First, an offer of a sexual act becomes an improper threat
when it creates a discriminatory conflict of interest for a custodian with monopoly
power.137 Second, custody leaves no reasonable alternative because prisoners do
not have access to a remedy before being coerced.138
Thus, treating custodial relations as categorically criminal is consistent with
the contract doctrine of duress by physical compulsion, which treats consent for
which there was no alternative at all as void ab initio.139 Taking the comparison
133

See Friedrick A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 136–37 (1960).

See Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why
Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1241 (2014) (explaining how
civil rights law fits antitrust theory under the common law principles regulating the powers and
corresponding duties of common carriers with monopoly power).
134

135
See Alaska Stat. § 11.41.427 (2018); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1412 to -1419 (2019);
Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-14-124 to -127 (2019); Cal. Penal Code § 261 (Deering 2018) (including
sexual acts “accomplished against the victim’s will by threatening to use the authority of a public
official to incarcerate, arrest or deport” as rape); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-3-402, -404 (2018); id.
§ 18-7-701; Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-71, -73a (2018); Fla. Stat. § 794.011 (2018); Ga. Code
Ann. § 16-6-5.1 (2017); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 707-731–32 (2017); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-9.2
(2016); Iowa Code § 709.16 (2017); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5512 (2017); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 510.060, .120 (2017); La. Stat. Ann. § 14:134.1 (2017); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 21A
(2017); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.145 (2017); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-322.02 (2018); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 212.188 (2017); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-07 (2017); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.3
(2017); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1111 (2017); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 163.452–54 (2017); tit. 11 R.I.
Gen. Laws § 11-25-24 (2016); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 22-22-7.6, 24-1-26.1 (2017); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-16-408 (2017); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 39.04 (2015); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-412
(West 2017); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-64.2 (2018); Wash Rev. Code §§ 9A.44.160–.170 (2017).
136

See infra notes 139–40.

See Schulhofer, supra note 123, at 147 (explaining that even a true offer implicitly signals
to both recipients and nonparties alike that the offeror has breached the duty of nondiscrimination).
137

138
See Habeas Corpus: Requirement of Exhaustion of State Remedies Before Issuance of Writ
Limited to State of Detention, 1963 Duke L.J. 374; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175
cmt. b., illus. 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (providing that the absence of market alternatives to the
breaching party’s performance may leave litigation inadequate “if the threat involves, for instance,
the seizure of property, the use of oppressive tactics, or the possibility of emotional consequences”).

Assent induced by physical compulsion is not only voidable, but void. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 174.
139
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to physical compulsion a step further, it bears noting that, despite the seemingly
unusual application of antitrust theory to sexual assault, deeming custodial
relations coercive is consistent with historical sexual assault doctrine.140 For
example, courts have found police officers guilty of sexually assaulting an arrestee
through “implied threats,” even under statutes recognizing force as the only kind
of coercion.141

IV. Advantages of the Common Law Approach
Acknowledging and refining the nonconsensual essence of sexual assault
will provide both direct and indirect benefits.142 Most directly, both punishing
nonconsensual acts and permitting consensual acts serve the first principle of
utilitarian morality.143 Further, insofar as people value their utility, they will be
motivated to enforce a sexual assault statute that properly defines consent.144
Finally, most indirectly, the benefits of defining of consent extend to the common
law as a whole.145

A. Substantive Justice
Legal economists measure utility using consent by relying on the presumption
that people consent to transactions that make them better off.146 Applying this
reasoning to sexual assault, a sound construction of consent will deter harmful
acts without curtailing sexual freedom.147
Deterring nonconsensual acts benefits society. Even if a criminal’s utility were
greater than the harm, requiring consent would not prevent a bargain where the
surplus utility is redistributed.148 Moreover, punishing such acts committed with

140

See infra note 143.

See State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 734 (R.I. 1987); Way v. United States, 982 A.2d 1135,
1137 (D.C. 2009); State v. Bright, 916 P.2d 922 (Wash. 1996); Sherman v. State Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, 190 A.3d 148, 186 (Del. 2018); Model Penal Code § 213.4(8) (Am. Law Inst. 1962).
141

142

See infra notes 145 – 69 and accompanying text.

143

See infra notes 148 –52 and accompanying text.

144

See infra notes 153– 61 and accompanying text.

145

See infra notes 162 – 69 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Contract Law’s Inefficiency, 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 301, 304–05,
306 n.15 (2012) (explaining the “attractively consensual” normative justification for contract law in
welfare economics since consensual transactions are strong Pareto optimal); Ronald H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1, 4 (1960) (observing that it will be profitable to strike a
utility enhancing bargain, regardless of where the parties’ rights lie).
146

147
Wertheimer, supra note 12, at 124 –25 (defining the value of sexual consent in terms of the
first principle of allowing mutually beneficial interactions).

See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193,
1195–97 (1985) (characterizing crimes as “market bypassing” where transaction costs are low).
148
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a criminal mens rea benefits society because, unlike productive risk taking, it
is impossible to over-deter intentional wrongdoing.149 Thus, a proper definition
of sexual consent serves the first normative principle of promoting social utility.
Furthermore, the constitution may require sex crimes to serve this principle.150

B. Public Cooperation
Since people value their utility, it is unsurprising that there is a strong
community consensus regarding the blameworthiness of the modern equivalents
of the common-law crimes.151 This consensus around nonconsensual crimes
promotes engagement with the criminal justice system, which requires coop
eration from witnesses, jurors, police officers, prosecutors, judges, victims, and
potential offenders in order to convict and deter.152 Inversely, modern offenses
prohibiting consensual conduct have higher rates of jury nullification.153
Public cooperation has also fallen in cases that prohibit consensual sexual
conduct.154 Thus, proponents of replacing the consent theory of sexual assault
with the abuse of power model must concede that the proposal would only
work if community standards were first changed.155 The issue remains sensitive
today, as the low reporting rate for sexual assault suggests low certainty regarding
the ability of the criminal justice system to punish the offenses it prohibits.156
Regardless of how community standards change, a clearer definition of
consent would promote the enforcement of sexual assault.157 Expansions of the

149
Id. (describing crimes as purely coercive transactions); Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 Yale L.J.
1489, 1561– 62 (1999) (noting that intentional wrongdoings cannot be over-deterred).
150
See, e.g., J. Richard Broughton, The Criminalization of Consensual Adult Sex After
Lawrence, 28 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 125, 142– 43 (2014) (exploring how types of
sexual assault can be argued to have a rational basis in consent).
151
Paul H. Robinson and Robert Kurzban find a statistically significant correlation among
Americans’ ordinal ranking of crimes and that “empirical desert” as the best cardinal predictor of
sentencing. Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance & Conflict in Intuitions of Justice,
91 Minn. L. Rev. 1829, 1871–73, 187– 88, 195–96 (2007). The same may be true internationally.
See Julian V. Roberts & Loretta J. Stalans, Crime, Criminal Justice, and Public Opinion, in The
Handbook of Crime and Punishment 42 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
152
See Paul H. Robinson et al., Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, and Limiting
Retribution: A Reply, 17 New Crim. L. Rev. 312, 315 (2014).
153
See Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. Marshall L. Rev.
911, 918 (1997) (discussing drug and alcohol prohibition and voluntary euthanasia).
154
See Schulhofer, supra note 123, at 253 (“As the code of medical ethics [banning all sexual
relations with patient] illustrate, the risk of an overly broad ban is not just that it may chill legitimate
relationships but that most practitioners will think it isn’t intended literally.”).
155

See Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power, supra note 88, at 178, 179 n.186.

156

See KC Johnson & Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Campus Rape Frenzy 47 (2017).

157

See infra notes 160– 61 and accompanying text.
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scope of the criminal law have generally succeeded when their justification relates
to the values behind traditional offenses.158 In particular, the overhaul of the
scope of sexual assault in the late 20th century was premised on prohibiting more
nonconsensual conduct.159

C. Unifying the Common Law
For scholars of legal interpretivism, the ultimate goal of jurisprudence is to
understand the law as a seamless web by filling gaps between apparently disparate
areas of law.160 According to this model of jurisprudence, the surest path to
advancing the law towards more just outcomes is to provide “the best justification
of our legal practices as a whole” that is consistent with primary sources.161 Thus,
the American Law Institute takes special pride in, for example, unifying tort and
contract law to create the Products Liability Restatement.162
As one of the most authoritative secondary sources, the Restatements of
the Law, especially in the area of contracts, are aimed to provide judges the
confidence to rule based on the relatively few legally recognized fundamental
principles in cases where binding authority is silent, inconsistent, or outdated.163
To bring a principled definition of consent to sexual assault is to achieve this
aim in a new area of law and, in particular, an area of law where judges have
great latitude to construe sexual assault statutes that do not go into greater
specificity than “consent.”164
A definition of consent that applies to such different actions as sexual assault
and breach of contract will serve interpretivist goals across the common law. In
contract, a defendant is held strictly liable for money damages based on a failure

Paul H. Robertson, Criminalizing Tensions: Empirical Desert, Changing Norms, and Rape
Reform, in The Structures Of The Criminal Law 198, 202 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2011) (listing
drunk driving, domestic abuse, and intellectual property infringement as examples).
158

159

See supra notes 3– 6 and accompanying text.

Thom Brooks, Between Natural Law and Legal Positivism: Dworkin and Hegel on Legal
Theory, 23 Ga. State U. L. Rev. 513, 533–38 (2007). Such a unified concept of law dates at least
to the time of Aristotle. Ryan Patrick Alford, How Do You Trim the Seamless Web? Considering the
Unintended Consequences of Pedagogical Alterations, 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1273, 1275–76 (2009).
160

161
Brooks, supra note 160, at 539. One of the best examples may be Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972), which combined tort and property along the axes of legal and equitable
remedies and entitlement to either a plaintiff or a defendant.

Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Symposium on the American Law Institute: Process, Partisanship,
and the Restatements of Law: The American Law Institute is Alive and Well, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 661,
663 (1998).
162

163

Adams, supra note 85, at 237 n.179.

164

See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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to fulfill a promise.165 In contrast, the remedy for most felonies is imprisonment
based on an act committed with a culpable state of mind.166 Accordingly, the
benefits of a sound definition of consent are not limited by distinctions between
act or omission, between remedies, or between states of mind.167

V. A Model Common Law Statute
Generally, nonconsensual sex is already criminal.168 Whether or not criminal
statutes explicitly define sexual assault with respect to consent or in terms of
what are, by definition, consent-defeating acts (such as coercion or fraud), the
statutes are still necessarily premised on consent and reach the same result.169 The
following model statute will define sexual assault as a nonconsensual sexual
act and provide details in the style of the consent defenses from contract law.
It is not meant to provide the most granular exposition of consent.170 Rather,
like the Restatements, it is aimed to create the most precise elucidation of
general principles.
Sexual Assault in the First Degree171
A person commits sexual assault when the actor, with general intent, performs
a sexual act upon another person, without consent.172
165
See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, 107 Mich. L.
Rev. 1381 (2009).

See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.01 (Am. Law Inst. 1962) (defining actus reus); id.
§ 2.02 (defining mens rea); Christopher & Christopher, supra note 38, at 114–15 (discussing the
exception to mens rea for statutory rape).
166

167
Both property and criminal law invoke remedies in kind, while both tort and contract law
typically result in monetary damages. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 161, at 1115–27
(discussing property, tort, and criminal remedies); supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing
contract remedies). Similarly, both property and contract law have causes of action sounding in are
strict liability, while tort and criminal causes of action typically require a culpable state of mind.
See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850) (finding tort negligence); Stewart E.
Sterk, Strict Liability and Negligence in Property Theory, 160 U. Penn. L. Rev. 2129 (2012) (discussing strict liability in property); Model Penal Code § 2.02 (defining criminal culpability);
Thomas W. Taylor, Contracts—Meeting of the Minds and U.C.C. § 2-204, 46 N.C. L. Rev. 637,
638 (1968) (discussing state of mind in contract law). Moreover, the apparent exception of strict
products liability torts to tort law’s negligence requirement was originally conceived as a contract
theory of breach of warranty theory sounding in contract. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P.2d 436, 464 (Cal. 1944) (Taynor, J. concurring).
168

See supra notes 104 – 43 and accompanying text.

169

See Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power, supra note 88, at 82.

In fact, such common law reasonableness standards in criminal law have been held void for
vagueness. See State v. Stanko, 974 P. 2d 1132 (Mont. 1998).
170

171
Sexual assault in the second degree might require the lesser actus reus of sexual contact,
rather than a sexual act. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

This section provision serves to illustrate that no other more specific actus reus is needed
than a nonconsensual sexual act. General intent could can be replaced with a modern criminal mens
172
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If conduct that appears to be a manifestation of assent by that
other person is compelled by duress, the act is without that
person’s consent.173
(i)

Administering to that other person, without the
consent of that person, a drug, intoxicant, or other
similar substance, which thereby substantially impairs
the ability of that other person to appraise or control
that person’s conduct, is an act of physical duress.174

(ii)

If that other person’s manifestation of assent is induced
by an improper threat by the actor, and that person is
left with no reasonable alternative, the act is without
that person’s consent.175
(A) An abuse of power constitutes an improper threat.176
(B) A sexual act performed upon a person in the
actor’s real or apparent custody is an improper
threat that leaves the other person with no
reasonable alternative.

(b)

If the other person has no legal capacity to consent, the act is
without that person’s consent.177
(i)

A person who is unconscious or helpless has no legal
capacity to consent.178

rea standard. See, e.g., Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 905, 909 (1939)
(discussing general intent as the threshold of criminal liability at common law). The Model Penal
Code defines recklessness as consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Model
Penal Code § 5.08.
173

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 174 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).

See Trigg v. State, 759 So. 2d 448, 451 (2000) (“[R]endering her unconscious with drugs . . .
require[s] . . . force.”). The definition of intoxication used in this model statute quotes Article 120
of the UCMJ. See 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2012).
174

175

Cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175; see also id. § 176.

Cf. id. § 176 (“A threat is improper if . . . what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for
illegitimate ends.”).
176

177

Cf. id. § 12 (defining undue influence).

See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Conundrum of Voluntary Intoxication and Sex,
82 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1031, 1050 (2017) (noting that the majority rule for intoxication is the
“physically helpless” standard).
178
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A person who is below the age of consent has no legal
capacity to consent.179

(iii) Mistake of age is not a defense to the offense described
in paragraph (b).
(c)

If conduct that appears to be a manifestation of assent by that
other person is induced by the actor’s undue influence, the
act is without that person’s consent.180 The manifestation of
assent is deemed to be induced by undue influence if:
(i)

The other person is between the age of consent and the
age of majority; and

(ii)

The other person is not married to the actor, and:
(A) The actor is more than four (4) years older than
the other person; or
(B) The actor is in a position of authority over the
other person.

(d)

If conduct that appears to be a manifestation of assent
is induced by fraud in the factum, the act is without that
person’s consent.
(i)

A fraudulent representation that the actor is another
person constitutes fraud in the factum.

(ii)

A fraudulent representation that the sexual act serves a
professional purpose constitutes fraud in the factum.181

VI. Conclusion
Framework or model building has two shortcomings. The first
is that models can be mistaken for the total view of phenomena,
like legal relationships, which are too complex to be painted in
any one picture. The second is that models generate boxes into

Ultimately the age of consent must be legislatively determined. See supra notes 34–38 and
accompanying text. This provision is using the age of consent as a placeholder for that determination
rather than imposing a flexible standard.
179

180

Cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 177.

181

Cf., e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 920(b)(1) (2012).
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which one then feels compelled to force situations which do not
truly fit.182
Consent is the traditional common-law framework for assessing utility,
whether in contract or sexual assault, or in other areas of law as well.183 Recog
nizing this conceptual unity is important for the criminal justice system to
inspire confidence.184
Despite frustration with the history of consent, the apparently inconsistent treatments of consent is reconcilable and, in fact, serves to illuminate
the principles of both criminal and contract law.185 While conditions of undue
influence, fraud, and abuse of power are unsettled in sexual assault scholarship,
they are bedrock principles of contract law.186 Accordingly, contract law provides
a model of consent to which sexual assault law should and does aspire.187 While
there will always be hard cases, contract law provides the best framework for
adjudicating consent.188

182

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 161, at 1127–28.

See supra notes 148 –52 and accompanying text (discussing consent and utility); supra notes
162–69 and accompanying text (exploring other areas of law).
183

184
See supra notes 162– 69 and accompanying text (explaining conceptual unity); supra notes
153–61 and accompanying text (addressing effective enforcement).
185

See supra notes 65 – 80 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 26 –103 and accompanying text (explaining the unsettled sexual consent
scholarship); supra notes 104–43 (explaining sexual assault law in terms of consent); supra notes
144–69 (providing model legislation for sexual consent in contractual terms).
186

187

See supra notes 26 –183.

188

See supra notes 104– 69 and accompanying text.
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